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Abstract
In loving memory of Asher Peres, we discuss a most important and
influential paper written in 1935 by his thesis supervisor and men-
tor Nathan Rosen, together with Albert Einstein and Boris Podolsky.
In that paper, the trio known as EPR questioned the completeness of
quantum mechanics. The authors argued that the then-new theory
should not be considered final because they believed it incapable of
describing physical reality. The epic battle between Einstein and Bohr
intensified following the latter’s response later the same year. Three
decades elapsed before John S. Bell gave a devastating proof that the
EPR argument was fatally flawed. The modest purpose of our paper
is to give a critical analysis of the original EPR paper and point out its
logical shortcomings in a way that could have been done 70 years ago,
with no need to wait for Bell’s theorem. We also present an overview
of Bohr’s response in the interest of showing how it failed to address
the gist of the EPR argument.
Dedicated to the memory of Asher Peres
1 Introduction
In 1935, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen published a
paper that sent shock waves in the physics community [5], especially in
Copenhagen. Le´on Rosenfeld wrote about the impact this paper had on Niels
Bohr, one of the fathers of quantum mechanics and its hardiest defender at
the time, that “this onslaught came down to us as a bolt from the blue” [11].
Quantum mechanics (QM) was still a relatively young theory, which had
arisen from several experimental facts. It exhibited so many weird features
that Bohr once said: “Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not
understood it” 1. Among the non-classical effects of QM, we note its funda-
mentally probabilistic nature and the fact that we cannot determine simul-
taneously the position and momentum of a particle with arbitrary precision.
In fact, forget about measuring them: QM tells us that these two conjugate
variables cannot have simultaneous existence. These exotic features did not
appeal to everyone in the physics community. To some, they were an indi-
cation that QM was incapable of fully describing physical reality. So, with
this thought in mind, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) published the
celebrated paper entitled “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical
reality be considered complete?” [5], in which they put forth an argumen-
tation purportedly answering their own question in the negative. Seventy
years after its publication, this is still the most heavily downloaded paper
from the American Physical Society website www.aps.org !
Even though there is evidence [7, 8] that Einstein had been thinking
about it as early as 1931, the notion of entanglement was first published
in the 1935 EPR paper. The authors used the correlations obtained from
bipartite measurements of an entangled state to claim that it is possible for
the position and momentum of a particle to have simultaneous existence.
Since the formalism of QM precludes such a possibility, they concluded that
QM cannot offer a complete description of physical reality. Even though the
term “local hidden variable” (LHV) was yet to be coined, it follows in their
opinion that nature has to feature LHVs that cannot be known collectively
through any experiment—for otherwise the Heisenberg uncertainty relations
would be violated—but nevertheless these variables determine the behaviour
of the physical system under measurement. Einstein then spent much of the
rest of his life in the vain search of such a theory.
1 Or something of the kind: we can find a variety of similar “quotes” attributed to Bohr
and it’s not clear what he really said! See http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Niels Bohr.
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Almost thirty years elapsed before a paper by John S. Bell doomed
EPR’s quest for a LHV theory of nature [2]. More specifically, Bell defined
the most general LHV model possible and showed that no such model can
yield the correlations predicted by QM when the entangled system proposed
by EPR—or more precisely its variation subsequently proposed by David
Bohm [3]—is measured, proving in effect that the EPR argument could not
show that QM is incomplete. Nevertheless, the situation could have been
worse for quantum mechanics: it could have been outright incorrect! Subse-
quent experiments [6, 1] established the supremacy of QM over LHV theories,
a somewhat ironic backfiring of the intent of the EPR paper. It is a great
pity that Einstein did not live to see these breakthroughs.
Even though it took the better part of three decades before Bell was able
to reject all possible LHV models, EPR’s conclusions were debated right
away. Two months after the publication of the EPR paper, Bohr submitted
a response to the same journal, with the exact same title [4]. Quite obviously,
Einstein was left entirely unconvinced by Bohr’s response. More on this in
Section 5.
We wish to present here, in loving memory of Asher Peres, a hopefully
insightful discussion of the EPR argument. The originality of our approach,
from a contemporary perspective, is that its purpose is to poke holes in the
the EPR paper without any reference to Bell’s inequality. Consequently, its
subtitle could have been: “Why we would have questioned EPR indepen-
dently of Bohr’s response, even before Bell came along”! The holes we poke
are nowhere as fatal as Bell’s and they do not rule out the possibility of a
LHV theory, which was therefore still a legitimate field of research until the
fateful year 1964. Instead, we show that the EPR exposition of their ideas
needed polishing for it is marred by several logical errors.
After this Introduction, we summarize in Section 2 the EPR argument
by quoting the most relevant excerpts from their paper. Section 3 is the
main contribution of our paper: we rephrase those quotes in the language
of mathematical logic, which allows us to analyse precisely the meaning of
the words used by EPR, and exhibit logical holes in them. We address the
issue of spukhafte Fernwirkungen in Section 4. In Section 5, we present an
overview of Bohr’s response to the EPR paper in the interest of showing how
it failed to address the gist of the EPR argument. Finally, we conclude in
Section 6.
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2 The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument
As for what should be considered a valid theory of nature, EPR proposed the
following two criteria: (1) the theory should be correct and (2) the theory
should be complete. Of course, the scientific paradigm should also demand
falsifiability as a criterion of validity, but the EPR argument hinges upon the
completeness (or purported lack of completeness) of QM. Specifically, the
authors give the following definition.2
Definition 1 (Completeness). Every element of the physical reality must have
a counterpart in the physical theory.
The definition of a physical reality given by EPR, which they “regard as
reasonable” with no further apparent need for justification, is spelt out in a
very famous quote from their paper.
Definition 2 (Physical reality). If, without in any way disturbing a system,
we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a
physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding
to this physical quantity.
As we shall see, the EPR argument is centred around two statements.
Statement A. Quantum mechanical description of reality is not complete.
Statement B. Non-commuting operators cannot have simultaneous reality.
They use both of these statements in an intricate manner in order to come
up with the final “conclusion” that Statement A must be true. The structure
of their proof can be established from the following two quotes, which appear
at the end of the first section of their paper.
(a) either (1) the quantum-mechanical description of reality given by the wave
function is not complete or (2) when operators corresponding to two physi-
cal quantities do not commute the two quantities cannot have simultaneous
reality.
2 Throughout this paper, we set quotes in sans serif whenever they are taken verbatim
from the EPR paper [5] or Bohr’s response [4], and we use (sans serif) italics in strict
accordance with the quoted material.
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(b) In quantum mechanics it is usually assumed that the wave function does
contain a complete description of the physical reality of the system in the
state to which it corresponds. [. . . ] We shall show, however, that this
assumption, together with the criterion of reality given above, leads to a
contradiction.
The argument culminates in their conclusion:
(c) Starting then with the assumption that the wave function does give a com-
plete description of the physical reality, we arrived at the conclusion that
two physical quantities, with noncommuting operators, can have simulta-
neous reality. [. . . ] We are thus forced to conclude that the quantum-
mechanical description of physical reality given by wave functions is not
complete.
3 The Language of Logic
To extract the substance of the EPR argument, we shall now rephrase its
structure in the language of mathematical logic. In this language, Quote (a)
translates to: “Either Statement A or Statement B”. The normal usage of
“either p or q” in English corresponds mathematically to the exclusive-or of
p and q, namely that either p or q is true but not both. This is written p⊕ q
in modern mathematical notation. Therefore, EPR’s first quote amounts to
saying that
A⊕ B . (1)
Quote (b) is a little more subtle to translate into the language of math-
ematical logic. First of all, we must understand that “the criterion of reality
given above”, at the end of the quote, corresponds to Statement B being true.
Therefore, Quote (b) translates to ¬A ∧ B⇒ false. This is mathematically
equivalent to saying that
¬A⇒ ¬B (2)
as can be verified easily using a truth table. Proposition (2) is stated more
explicitly in the first sentence of Quote (c) above.
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Given that EPR eventually derive their desired conclusion, namely State-
ment A, after “establishing” the truth of both quotes, their final argument—
Quote (c)—hinges upon logical tautology (1) ∧ (2)⇒ A:
(A⊕ B) ∧ (¬A⇒ ¬B)⇒ A . (3)
Having set the stage for our logical analysis of the EPR argument, we
now proceed to discussing these three propositions one by one.
3.1 The First Proposition
In order to establish A ⊕ B, it must be shown that either Statement A or
Statement B holds. To do this, EPR used the fact that the formalism of
QM does not allow for a particle’s position and momentum to be simul-
taneously defined. Therefore, if position and momentum do indeed have
simultaneous reality (negation of Statement B) then QM cannot be complete
(Statement A). In other words, ¬B⇒ A. Furthermore, they also argued
that if QM is already a complete theory (negation of Statement A) then it
must be the case that position and momentum cannot have simultaneous
reality (Statement B). In other words, ¬A⇒ B.
At this point, we remark that working through both implications was
redundant since they are logically equivalent, each one being the contrapos-
itive of the other. A more serious problem with the EPR argumentation is
that the desired conclusion (1) does not follow! Indeed, ¬A⇒ B is logically
equivalent to A ∨ B, which cannot be used to conclude that A⊕ B. Worse:
no amount of logical reasoning can save the day since nowhere do EPR argue
that it’s not possible for both Statements A and B to hold, and indeed that
would be possible should QM be incomplete for some other reason!
We suspect that this problem with the EPR argument simply comes from
our (linguistically correct) interpretation of the word “either” in Quote (a)
from Section 2: Instead of Proposition (1), no doubt EPR had
A ∨ B (4)
in mind, which indeed is correct, even by today’s account. This happened
either because EPR were not careful in their use of the English language,
or because the meaning of “either” has evolved in the past seventy years.
But there is no reason to worry further about this issue since we shall see in
Section 3.3 that it has no real impact on the EPR conclusion.
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3.2 The Second Proposition
In order to “prove” ¬A ⇒ ¬B, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen used a bipar-
tite entangled state of two particles, where two physicists, say Alice and
Bob, take one particle each and move to space-like separated regions. Let us
assume that Alice performs a momentum measurement on her particle. From
the measurement postulate of QM, she is then able to predict with certainty
the outcome of a momentum measurement on Bob’s particle. Since Alice
and Bob are in space-like separated regions, there cannot be any further
interaction between the particles once they are separated. Therefore, Alice’s
measurement cannot have disturbed Bob’s system in any way. Hence, accord-
ing to Definition 2, momentum corresponds to an element of physical reality
for Bob’s particle. Let us change the assumption to a position measurement
on Alice’s part of the entangled state, instead of a momentum measurement.
Once again, she will be able to predict the result of a position measure-
ment on Bob’s particle without having disturbed it. Therefore, position also
corresponds to an element of physical reality for Bob’s particle. It “follows”
that position and momentum (two non-commuting operators) had to have
simultaneous reality before either measurement. This “establishes” that B
is false.
The flaw, of course, is that EPR’s argument hinged upon counterfactual
arguments of the kind “the physicist could do this or he could do that” in
cases when clearly he could not do both. Nobody put this flaw in better light
than Asher Peres, in his famous aphorism: “Unperformed experiments have
no results” [10]. Since Alice cannot perform both measurements, it is not
the case that both outcomes are defined simultaneously. Being fully aware
that Einstein would have been left utterly unconvinced by this reasoning, we
take here a different line of attack, based on logic rather than physics.
Recall that we were supposed to prove ¬A ⇒ ¬B. The careful reader
will have noticed that EPR reached their desired “¬B” conclusion without
having at any point invoked the assumption “¬A”! Indeed, the reasoning did
not hinge upon the completeness of QM or lack thereof. Instead, it hinged
upon the correctness of QM, in particular the correctness of the measurement
postulate. Therefore, if we are willing to assume that QM is correct in terms
of its predictions about what can be observed—which we believed to have
been EPR’s point of view—then the EPR argument that purports to prove
¬A⇒ ¬B in fact directly “proves” ¬B.
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3.3 The Tautology
From a purely logical point of view, there is nothing to complain about
here. . . at least on first approach. Proposition (3) is indeed a tautology, as
is easily seen by use of a truth table or a rather simple logical argument 3.
However, this tautology is not genuinely relevant to the EPR argument.
First of all, as discussed in Section 3.1, Proposition (1) should be replaced
by Proposition (4) in the tautology (3), yielding
(A ∨ B) ∧ (¬A⇒ ¬B)⇒ A . (5)
The good news is that Proposition (5) is also a tautology, whence the issue
of the precise meaning of “either. . . or” turns out to be moot, as promised at
the end of Section 3.1.
But now remember that, notwithstanding Quote (b), the reasoning given
by EPR does not prove Proposition (2) since they used nowhere the assump-
tion “¬A” that QM is complete. Rather, they “proved” ¬B directly, under
the sole assumption that QM is correct—in particular the measurement
postulate—which seems to be taken for granted throughout the paper so
strongly that it’s not worth calling it an “assumption”. Therefore, the some-
what complicated-looking tautology that we wrote down as Proposition (3),
to translate the English written words of EPR, boils down in the end to
nothing more than:
(A ∨ B) ∧ ¬B⇒ A . (6)
This statement is such a triviality 4 that we are forced to conclude that the
original tautology was a smoke-screen at best.
In summary, the EPR conclusion may have been correct had they been
allowed to make counterfactual reasoning, but their logic to get there was
unnecessarily intricate and even outright wrong in some places.
3 Assume A to be false. Then B is true since A ⊕ B. But then A would be true since
¬A ⇒ ¬B is equivalent to B⇒ A and B is true. This contradicts the assumption that A
is false, and it must therefore be the case that A is true.
4 If A or B is true and it is not B, then it must be A. Please compare this with the
reasoning spelt out in the previous footnote!
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4 Spukhafte Fernwirkungen
Consider the following quote from the EPR paper, which corresponds to the
situation after an interaction has left two particles in the singlet state.
We can then calculate with the help of Schro¨dinger’s equation the
state of the combined system [. . . ]. We cannot, however, calculate
the state in which either one of the two systems is left after the
interaction. This, according to quantum mechanics, can be done
only with the help of further measurements, by a process know as
the reduction of the wave packet.
From a modern perspective, this is utter nonsense! Of course we can calcu-
late the state of either system by use of partial tracing: it’s the completely
mixed state. Obviously, EPR considered that only pure states deserve being
called “states”. Given their insistence on “elements of reality”, this position
is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, we must point out that von Neumann
had already introduced density matrices [9] a few years before EPR wrote
their paper.
If we take the epistemic viewpoint according to which the density matrix
corresponding to Bob’s possible knowledge is all there is to the state of his
particle, then Alice’s measurement in a space-like separated region has no
instantaneous influence on that state. It’s only if and when Alice tells Bob the
result of her measurement that the state of Bob’s particle changes at Bob’s,
but this communication cannot take place faster than the speed of light:
spukhafte Fernwirkungen no more! 5
We mentioned the above in the interest of readers who may still be under
the delusion that Alice’s measurement has an instantaneous influence on
the state of Bob’s particle. However, we acknowledge that this issue is not
central to a discussion of the EPR paper since they took the unambiguous
(and correct) position that such influence would not take place. Their mistake
was in taking the ontic position that all states are pure, from which it follows
that the state of Bob’s particle is defined independently of Alice’s or Bob’s
knowledge about it.
5 With apologies to Spider-Man! :-)
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5 Bohr’s Response
In his response, Bohr [4] hardly addresses the issue of entanglement. For him,
the phenomenon described in the EPR paper is nothing more than what he
calls complementarity. He claims that in QM, as well as in general relativ-
ity, we must take into account the measuring device to make predictions on
the object of interest. In essence, Bohr argues that position and momentum
cannot both be measured with an arbitrary precision because we cannot do so
experimentally, even in principle. A measure of the momentum of a particle
can only be experimentally realized by a momentum transfer on the measure-
ment apparatus, therefore creating a displacement and forsaking forever the
knowledge of the position of the particle. In the EPR argument, says Bohr,
when Alice measures the momentum of her particle, she learns that of Bob’s,
but at the same time renounces by her own free choice to the knowledge of
position that she could have obtained on Bob’s particle. This renunciation is
based on the fact that we cannot predict the result of a measurement. In the
example given above, if we want to measure the momentum of a particle,
since there is no way to predict either the momentum exchange or the dis-
placement caused by it, we cannot know with certainty where the particle
interacted with the apparatus. The following quote summarizes Bohr’s argu-
ment.
In fact, the renunciation in each experimental arrangement of the
one or the other of two aspects of the description of physical
phenomena,—the combination of which characterizes the method
of classical physics, and which therefore in this sense may be con-
sidered as complementary to one another,—depends essentially on
the impossibility, in the field of quantum theory, of accurately con-
trolling the reaction of the object on the measuring instruments,
i.e., the transfer of momentum in case of position measurements,
and the displacement in case of momentum measurements.
The problem, of course, is that EPR had no issue with complementarity!
They did not claim in their paper that it would be possible to know simul-
taneously the position and momentum of a particle with arbitrary precision.
Indeed, had they not agreed with this manifestation of Heisenberg’s uncer-
tainty relations, they would surely have claimed that QM is outright incor-
rect, not merely incomplete! Their disagreement with the view of QM is
summarized in the following quote from their paper:
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The usual conclusion from this 6 in quantum mechanics is that when
the momentum of a particle is known, its coordinate has no physical
reality.
So, we see that, in the views of EPR, the incompleteness of QM has to
do with the fact that it does not allow simultaneous reality for two non-
commuting observables. Whether or not these two realities could be learned
simultaneously is irrelevant to their argument. The fact that QM allows us
to predict either the momentum or the position of a particle without having
interacted with it, mutually exclusive as these measurements might be, seems
to mean, according to Definition 2, that both of these quantities have physical
reality. Therefore QM appears to be incomplete, according to their criterion
of Definition 1.
6 Conclusion
We exhibited problems with the EPR argument, when seen through the eyes
of mathematical logic, without any reference to Bell’s inequality. We also
questioned the narrow-minded view of “states” taken in that paper, although
that view is not surprising from advocates of “elements of reality”. Speaking
of which, we should like to add to the criticisms laboured in our paper that
the notion of “elements of reality” is left rather vague in the EPR paper.
Nevertheless, we came down even harder on Bohr’s response which, in our
opinion, had entirely failed to address the main issue raised by EPR.
In retrospect, our criticism of the EPR paper notwithstanding, we admit
without shame that we would have been more likely to side with them than
with Bohr. . . until the bolt gave way to thunder under Bell’s pen!
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Jeffrey Bub, Hilary Carteret, Christopher Fuchs
and N. David Mermin for their comments and for helping us interpret both
the EPR paper and Bohr’s response. G.B. is supported in part by the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the Canada Research
Chair programme and the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.
6 Measuring the coordinate of a particle alters its state.
11
References
[1] Aspect, A., Grangier, P. and Roger, G., “Experimental tests of
realistic local theories via Bell’s theorem”, Physical Review Letters,
47:460–463, 1981.
[2] Bell, J. S., “On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox”, Physics
1:195–200, 1964.
[3] Bohm, D., Quantum Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1951.
[4] Bohr, N., “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be
considered complete?”, Physical Review 48:696–702, 1935.
[5] Einstein, A., Podolsky, B. and Rosen, N., “Can quantum-
mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?”,
Physical Review 47: 777–780, 1935.
[6] Freedman, S. J. and Clauser, J. F., “Experimental test of local
hidden-variable theories”, Physical Review Letters 28(14):938-941, 1972.
[7] Fuchs, C. A., Notes on a Paulian Idea: Foundational, Historical,
Anecdotal & Forward-Looking Thoughts on the Quantum, with a fore-
word by N.D. Mermin, Va¨xjo¨ University Press, Va¨xjo¨, Sweden, 2003,
pp. 639–641. See also quant-ph/0105039, pp. 446–447.
[8] Jammer, M., “The EPR problem in its historical development”,
in Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics: 50 Years
of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Gedankenexperiment, (P. Lahti and
P. Mittelstaedt, eds.), World Scientific, Singapore, 1985, pp. 129–149.
[9] von Neumann, J., Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik,
Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1932.
[10] Peres, A., “Unperformed experiments have no results”, American
Journal of Physics 46(7):745–747, 1978.
[11] Rosenfeld, L., “Niels Bohr in the Thirties”, in Niels Bohr: His
Life and Work Seen by his Friends and Colleagues (S. Rozental, ed.),
Interscience, 1964.
12
